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that making UNEP a specialised agency would heighten 
its role and influence in sustainable development while 
others believed that member States must draw on already-
existing expertise. 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the co-chairs proposed 
a draft negotiating document to be transmitted to CSD-19, 
outlining the process for reaching a final document in 2012. 
The draft was adopted by consensus7 and the delegates 
appeared satisfied that, although much work remains to be 
done, both for Rio+20 and for implementing sustainable 
development, PrepCom 2 had made progress. 
Notes
1 Member States will decide on the structure and content of the 10YFP on SCP 




3 Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of 
Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. For 
more information, see http://www.sidsnet.org/msi_5/.
4 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_intro.htm. 
5 See http://esa.un.org/marrakechprocess/tenyearframework.shtml.





– Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability –
by Donald K. Anton, Robert A. Makgill and Cymie R. Payne
On 1 February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
(“the Chamber”) delivered its first Advisory Opinion. 
The Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) 
requested the advice of the Chamber – the body within 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
with the relevant jurisdiction1 – on the limits of State 
liability when a contractor that a State is sponsoring to 
explore or exploit the seabed in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction causes damage or harm. In providing this 
advice, the Chamber was also requested to opine on the 
primary international obligations of a sponsoring State 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS or Convention), the breach of which would 
give rise to responsibility.
The case involved at least four historic firsts. It is 
the first time that the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS has 
been invoked. It is the first time that the Tribunal has 
been unanimous in a ruling without separate opinions or 
declarations containing varying rationale – a testament 
to the President of the Chamber, Tullio Treves. It is the 
first time that non-governmental organisations – Stichting 
Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature submitting together– have 
had a written submission linked on the ITLOS website 
(although it was not made part of the case file), despite the 
fact that no treaty rule or internal ruling of the Tribunal 
provides for such a procedure. It is also the first time that 
oral proceedings in ITLOS have been webcast live.
By way of background, the case naturally originates 
with the Convention, which declares the seabed and 
its resources that lie beyond national jurisdiction (a 
geographical component known as “The Area” in ITLOS 
circles) to be “the common heritage of mankind”.2 This was 
one of the most significant achievements of international 
law during the twentieth century. The doctrine of common 
heritage establishes norms preserving a large part of ocean 
space as a commons accessible and shared by all States. 
An important concomitant of common heritage 
in UNCLOS is the explicit promotion of effective 
participation and special consideration of developing 
States in the exploration and exploitation of minerals in 
the Area. This, in turn, is implemented by what is known 
as a “parallel system” of exploration and exploitation 
(as modified by the 1994 Implementation Agreement).3 
The parallel system places exploration and exploitation 
of the Area under the control of the International Seabed 
Authority. All prospective exploration and exploitation 
activities (either carried out by a State entity or a private 
entity) are required to be sponsored by a party to UNCLOS 
and sponsoring States must apply to the ISA for approval of 
a plan of work for exploration and licences for exploitation. 
In the case of developing States, under the parallel system 
established under UNCLOS, one section of the Area 
ITLOS / Case No. 17
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subject to a plan of work is reserved for activities by 
the ISA “in association with developing States”.4 These 
sections are referred to as “reserved areas”. 
In 2008, two applications for approval of plans of work 
for exploration in a reserved area were received by the 
ISA. They were lodged by Nauru Ocean Resources, Inc. 
(a Nauruan corporation sponsored by Nauru) and Tonga 
Offshore Mining Ltd (a Tongan corporation sponsored by 
Tonga). However, in 2009, because of a concern about 
liability for damage caused by exploration, a request was 
made to the ISA that both applications be postponed. 
Before proceeding, Nauru proposed that the ISA seek an 
Advisory Opinion from the Chamber on several specific 
questions to clarify the liability of sponsoring States. In 
support of its proposal, Nauru submitted the following:
 …Nauru, like many other developing States, does 
not yet possess the technical and financial capacity 
to undertake seafloor mining in international waters. 
To participate effectively in activities in the Area, 
these States must engage entities in the global private 
sector …. Not only do some developing States lack the 
financial capacity to execute a seafloor mining project 
in international waters, but some also cannot afford 
exposure to the legal risks potentially associated with 
such a project. Recognizing this, Nauru’s sponsorship 
of Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. was originally premised 
on the assumption that Nauru could effectively mitigate 
…the potential liabilities or costs arising from its 
sponsorship. This was important, as these liabilities 
or costs could, in some circumstances, far exceed 
the financial capacities of Nauru …. [Ultimately], if 
sponsoring States are exposed to potential significant 
liabilities, Nauru, as well as other developing States, 
may be precluded from effectively participating in 
activities in the Area.5
Ultimately, the Council of the ISA decided to request an 
Advisory Opinion from the Chamber on three questions:
1. What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of 
States Parties to the Convention with respect to the 
sponsorship of activities in the Area in accordance with 
the Convention, in particular Part XI, and the 1994 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982?
2. What is the extent of liability of a State Party for any 
failure to comply with the provisions of the Convention, 
in particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement, by an 
entity whom it has sponsored under Article 153, 
paragraph 2 (b), of the Convention?
3. What are the necessary and appropriate measures 
that a sponsoring State must take in order to fulfil its 
responsibility under the Convention, in particular Article 
139 and Annex III, and the 1994 Agreement?6
The Advisory Opinion provides further illumination of 
a number of concepts, principles and norms that underpin 
environmental protection of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. It also advances ITLOS jurisprudence in 
significant ways. 
Preliminary Matters
Before turning to the substantive questions, the 
Chamber first dealt with a number of preliminary 
matters. In particular, the Chamber took up the issue of 
its jurisdiction, the admissibility of the case, the law to be 
applied, and questions of treaty interpretation.7 For reasons 
of space, we address the three most interesting aspects of 
these preliminaries.
First, in considering the admissibility of the case, the 
Chamber declined to decide whether it has discretion to 
decline to issue an Advisory Opinion when it has clear 
jurisdiction. The Chamber noted the difference between 
Article 191 of the Convention, stating that the Chamber 
“shall give” an Advisory Opinion,8 and the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which states 
that the Court “may give” an Advisory Opinion.9 Some 
participants10 were of the view that provided that there 
is 1) a request from the Council, 2) it concerns a legal 
question, and 3) the question arises within the scope 
of the Council’s activities, then the Chamber cannot 
consider whether judicial propriety might otherwise lead 
the Chamber to decline to hear a case. In other words, 
under the Convention, the Chamber might not be able to 
proceed in the manner in which the Permanent Court of 
International Justice did in Eastern Carelia, declining to 
issue an Advisory Opinion because it would be tantamount 
to deciding a contentious case without consent.11
Second, unsurprisingly, the Chamber invoked the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)12 
as reflective of the customary rules that it is bound to 
apply in the interpretation of the Convention. However, 
this is the first time that the Tribunal has been explicit in 
stating that Articles 31–33 of the VCLT reflect customary 
international law. It is also the first time it has used the 
VCLT to interpret relevant instruments that are not treaties 
– specifically the Regulations on Polymetallic Nodules and 
Polymetallic Sulfides. This is an interpretive posture the 
ICJ recently adopted in connection with Security Council 
Resolution1244 authorising an international presence in 
Kosovo.13 
Third, the Chamber resolved problems with the use of 
the terms “obligation”, “responsibility” and “liability” in 
the English text by reference to the equally authoritative 
Arabic, Chinese, French, Spanish and Russian texts 
of UNCLOS. Observing that use of these terms is 
consistent in all other texts and that usage is consistent 
with the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles 
on State Responsibility, it concludes that the phrase 
“legal responsibilities” and “responsibility” mentioned 
in Questions 1 and 3 relate to the primary international 
legal obligations placed on sponsoring States by the 
Convention, the 1994 Agreement, and related instruments. 
In Question 2, the term “liability” refers, counterintuitively 
but entirely correctly, to the secondary rules governing 
the consequences of a breach of a sponsoring State’s 
obligations – in other words, State responsibility. 
Question 1
Question 1 is perhaps the most significant part of 
the Advisory Opinion. This aspect of the Chamber’s 
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decision added clear momentum to the development of 
international environmental law, especially as it relates 
to the obligations of States with respect to the common 
heritage of humankind.
In preliminary analysis, however, Chamber found it 
necessary to determine the ambit of activities included 
under Question 1 because the question concerned 
sponsoring State obligations in connection with “activities 
in the Area”. Interpreting the Convention, the Chamber 
found that, for this purpose, the concepts of exploration 
and exploitation include recovery of minerals from the 
seabed, lifting them to the water surface and other directly 
related activities. It does not include processing on land or 
transportation from the high seas superjacent to the part of 
the Area in which exploration or exploitation occurs.14
David Freestone has observed that this distinction 
limits the applicability of the ruling and the liability of 
States because the obligations of sponsoring States under 
the Convention do not extend to activities outside of 
the Area.15 Although the Chamber did not address this, 
Article 192 creates a general obligation for States to 
protect and preserve the entire marine environment. This 
obligation extends to activities undertaken outside of the 
Area. Furthermore, Article 235 makes clear that States are 
responsible for the fulfilment of their obligations to protect 
and preserve the marine environment and can be held liable 
in accordance with general international law. 
The Primary Obligations
The Chamber commenced this part of the Advisory 
Opinion by identifying the key provisions concerning the 
obligations of sponsoring States as follows:16
Article 139(1)
 States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure 
that activities in the Area, whether carried out by States 
Parties, or State enterprises or natural or juridical 
persons which possess the nationality of States 
Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their 
nationals, shall be carried out in conformity with this 
Part. The same responsibility applies to international 
organizations for activities in the Area carried out by 
such organizations.
Article 153(4)
 The Authority shall exercise such control over activities 
in the Area as is necessary for the purpose of securing 
compliance with the relevant provisions of this Part 
and the Annexes relating thereto, and the rules, 
regulations and procedures of the Authority, and the 
plans of work approved in accordance with paragraph 
3. States Parties shall assist the Authority by taking 
all measures necessary to ensure such compliance in 
accordance with Article 139.
Annex III, Article 4(4)
 The sponsoring State or States shall, pursuant to 
Article 139, have the responsibility to ensure, within 
their legal systems, that a contractor so sponsored 
shall carry out activities in the Area in conformity 
with the terms of its contract and its obligations 
under this Convention. A sponsoring State shall 
not, however, be liable for damage caused by any 
failure of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with 
its obligations if that State Party has adopted laws 
and regulations and taken administrative measures 
which are, within the framework of its legal system, 
reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by 
persons under its jurisdiction.
The Chamber determined that the basic obligation of 
a sponsoring State is to ensure that the activities in the 
Area conducted by the sponsored entity or contractor are 
“in conformity” or “in compliance” with:17
• Part XI of the Convention (governing The Area); 
• Relevant Annexes to the Convention;
• Rules, Regulations and Procedures of the Authority;
• The terms of its exploration contract with the Authority; 
and 
• Any other obligations under the Convention.
All of this is relatively straightforward, but it was 
the need to analyse the “duty to ensure” that required 
the Chamber to discuss the general international due 
diligence obligation not to cause harm to the environment 
beyond national jurisdiction. This concept of the rule of 
law has a long history, from early mention in Moore’s 
Digest in 1906, through the Trail Smelter case, Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration, the ILC Draft Articles 
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities and, most recently, the ICJ’s decision in the 
Pulp Mills case.18
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Due Diligence
Due diligence is an obligation of conduct and not of 
result. Accordingly, the sponsoring State’s obligation 
to ensure is not to achieve the result that a contractor 
complies with the requirements of the Convention. Rather, 
the Chamber described it as an obligation “to deploy 
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the 
utmost to achieve this result”.19 Considering the content 
of the due diligence obligation, the Chamber described 
it as a “variable concept” that “may change over time 
as measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain 
moment, for instance, may not be diligent enough in light 
of new scientific or technological knowledge”. Further, the 
Chamber recognised that “the standard of due diligence 
has to be more severe for … riskier activities”.20
The Chamber goes on to point out that the Convention 
gives some guidance as to the content of the “due diligence” 
obligation to ensure. “Necessary measures [to ensure 
compliance] are required and these must be adopted within 
the legal system of the sponsoring State”.21 In particular, the 
Convention requires the sponsoring State to adopt “laws and 
regulations” and to take “administrative measures which 
are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably 
appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its 
jurisdiction”.22 The Chamber gives more specific indications 
concerning the content of these measures, including their 
enforcement, under its reply to Question 3.
Following its discussion of due diligence, the Chamber 
proceeded to put “meat on the bones” by considering 
the “direct obligations” of sponsoring States under 
the Convention and general international law. Three 
particularly important direct obligations are:
• The Precautionary Approach;
• Best Environmental Practices; and
• Environmental Impact Assessment.
Turning to the precautionary approach, the Chamber 
stated that the link between an obligation of due 
diligence and the precautionary approach is implicit in 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases.23 It then observed “that 
the precautionary approach has been incorporated into a 
growing number of international treaties and instruments, 
many of which reflect the formulation of Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration”. In the Chamber’s view “this has 
initiated a trend towards making this approach part of 
customary international law”.
The Chamber cited the Convention’s regulations and 
the ICJ’s invocation of the precautionary approach in the 
Pulp Mills case as support for its applicability here.24 The 
mining regulations, governing prospecting and exploration 
for polymetallic nodules and sulphides, explicitly require 
States and the ISA to apply Rio Declaration Principle 15. 
That formulation requires that “where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. 
The Chamber noted that under Principle 15, States are 
to apply precaution “according to their capabilities”, 
which might indicate a less strict standard for developing 
States.25
In light of the Chamber’s findings, it concluded that 
States must apply a precautionary approach as an integral 
part of their due diligence obligations “in situations where 
scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential 
negative impact of the activity in question is insufficient 
but where there are plausible indications of potential 
risks”. Disregarding such risks would constitute a failure to 
comply with the precautionary approach, and accordingly 
a failure to meet the State’s due diligence obligation.
As mentioned, another direct obligation includes 
“best environmental practices”. The Chamber observed 
that “best environmental practices” are required by the 
ISA regulations and the standard clauses for exploration 
contracts. The Chamber appears to be of the view that the 
express requirement for “best environmental practices” 
under the regulations and standard clauses heralds a raise 
in standard from use of “best technology available”. 
“Best environmental practices” certainly appears to be 
a much broader concept than best available technology. 
Whereas the latter appears to be limited by what is 
technologically achievable, a survey of the former in a 
variety of international instruments shows that it requires 
the application of the most appropriate combination 
of environmental control measures and strategies.26 
Moreover, this obligation is the same for developed and 
developing States.
The third significant direct obligation is the requirement 
for the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). Referring to the ICJ’s Pulp Mills judgment, the 
Chamber stressed that EIA is both “a direct obligation under 
the Convention and a general obligation under customary 
international law”.27 The Chamber acknowledged that 
the ICJ decision had been limited to consideration of 
impacts on the environment in a transboundary context. 
It went on to state, however, that the ICJ’s reasoning may 
also apply to activities in an area beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction, and the Court’s references to “shared 
resources” may apply to resources that are the common 
heritage of mankind.28 The Court concluded by stating that 
the EIA requirement extended beyond the scope of the 
application of the specific provisions of the regulations.
Developing States
In light of the background to the request for the 
Advisory Opinion, the Chamber went to some length 
to consider whether the Convention applied different 
standards of due diligence to developing and developed 
States. It found that there is specific provision under Part 
XI of the Convention for the promotion of developing 
State participation in activities in the Area. However, none 
of the general provisions of the Convention concerning 
responsibilities or liability accord preferential treatment 
to sponsoring States.
Accordingly, the general provisions concerning 
responsibility and liability apply equally to all sponsoring 
States. The standard of due diligence owed by sponsoring 
States is not to be differentiated based on levels of 
economic development, with the exception of the 
precautionary approach; which as discussed above may 
import reference to different capabilities under Principle 
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15 of the Rio Declaration. The Chamber reasoned that 
equality of treatment is necessary to avert the spread 
of sponsoring States “of convenience” with little or no 
regulatory requirements, which “would jeopardize uniform 
application of the highest standards of protection of the 
marine environment, the safe development of activities 
in the Area and protection of the common heritage of 
mankind”.29
Question 2
Question 2 comprised the crux of Nauru’s concern 
about expansive State liability that would pose a barrier 
to developing State sponsorship of activities in the Area. 
On the other hand, the question raised the prospect of 
situations in which damage may be occasioned, but for 
which no remedy is available. UNCLOS Article 139(2) 
sets out the limits of State responsibility for sponsoring 
States. It does, however, leave a “liability gap” in at least 
three instances:
• where a State takes all necessary and/or appropriate 
measures required by international law and the 
blameless actions of the contractor nevertheless cause 
environmental harm; 
• where a State takes the requisite necessary and/
or appropriate measures and the private operator is 
blameworthy, but insolvent or its assets are beyond 
the reach of the sponsoring State; and
• where the sponsoring State has failed to take the 
required measures but there is no causal link with the 
environmental harm. 
The question in such cases is what entity, if any, must 
bear the loss in this circumstance? The Chamber’s answer 
to this question under UNCLOS Article 139(2) and related 
instruments is that the State does not bear 
residual liability. This is reflected in the 
maxim damnum absque injuria – damage 
without wrong (in the sense that an action 
will not lie).30
The emerging trend in international 
law is reflected in the ILC’s Principles 
on the allocation of loss in the case 
of transboundary harm arising out of 
hazardous activities. The point of departure 
for the principles on allocation is the 
establishment by Principle 4(2) of principal 
liability for a private operator(s) in the first 
instance. However, the Principles recognise 
a situation may arise in which prompt and 
adequate compensation for harm by a 
private operator, like a sponsored entity, 
fails. In such a situation, a residual liability 
remains with the State under Principle 4(5) “to ensure that 
additional financial resources are made available”.
The Chamber was unwilling to read this much into 
applicable international law. It did, however, emphasise 
that under Article 304 of the Convention, the “regime 
of international law on responsibility and liability is 
not … static [and] opens the liability regime for deep 
seabed mining to new developments [customary or 
conventional] in international law”.31 It also indicated 
a strict liability regime could be introduced via the ISA 
Mining Regulations. Thus, the principle of residual 
liability may one day find its place. For now, though, the 
Chamber suggests that a possible solution could be the 
establishment of a trust fund, although how it would be 
established and funded raises further problems.32
In connection with Question 2, the Chamber indicated, 
citing the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 48, 
that obligations to preserve the environment of the high 
seas and in the Area may be erga omnes, that is, owed to the 
international community as a whole, or erga omnes partes, 
“to a group of States [if the obligation] is established 
for the protection of a collective interest of the group”. 
The Chamber noted that the ISA acts “on behalf of” 
humankind and so might be able to claim compensation, 
as might “entities engaged in deep seabed mining, other 
users of the sea, and coastal States”.33 It further observed 
that “[e]ach State Party may also be entitled to claim 
compensation in light of the erga omnes character” of these 
obligations.34 While the Chamber’s language can be read 
as hypothetising (“may”), it tends to equate the principle 
of “common heritage” and environmental protection with 
the classic examples of erga omnes obligations identified 
by the Barcelona Traction and East Timor cases – 
genocide, aggression, slavery, racial discrimination and 
self-determination.35
Question 3
As expected, the Chamber gave a general response in 
specifying the measures that a sponsoring State must take 
to ensure that it has acted with all requisite due diligence. 
The Chamber had really answered this in replying to the 
first question. In particular, a State must have effective laws 
and supporting administrative regulations in 
place; simple contractual arrangements are 
not sufficient. Those laws and regulations 
must be regularly enforced by monitoring 
and inspection. Moreover, they must be 
“no less effective than international rules, 
regulations and procedures”,36 primarily 
those adopted by the Authority. 
The Chamber’s emphasis, that laws 
and regulations by themselves may not be 
sufficient, reiterates the ICJ’s observation 
in the Pulp Mills case that a State must both 
enact and enforce legislation designed to 
ensure the compliance of its nationals.37 In 
particular the Chamber observed that “[a]
dministrative measures aimed at securing 
compliance with them may also be needed. 
Laws, regulations and administrative 
measures may include the establishment of enforcement 
mechanisms for active supervision of the activities of the 
sponsored contractor.”38
These requirements (along with the non-differentiated 
high standard of due diligence) will challenge developing 
States to put adequate legal rules and structures in place to 
ensure they meet the obligations outlined by the Chamber. 
It may mean that developing States will look to sponsored 
Courtesy: ISA
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entities to finance the implementation and administration 
of domestic legislation governing mining activities in the 
Area. In these circumstances it is likely that measures will 
focus on environmental management of activity-specific 
proposals in defined locations rather than comprehensive 
governance of seabed mining in the Area. Equally, it may 
prompt sponsorship partnerships with developed States 
with well-developed legal, monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities.
Conclusion
The advisory opinion has provided useful guidance 
to the international community concerned with the deep 
seabed. First and foremost, the Chamber has accomplished 
its task to assist the ISA with independent and impartial 
judicial interpretation of the Convention and related 
instruments. States that intend to extract valuable resources 
now know that they must evaluate their legal codes, 
administrative capacity, and their judicial enforcement 
mechanisms to determine where they fall short of the 
standards that the Chamber has identified. For most States 
it will be necessary to introduce new laws to provide 
the requisite rules, regulations and procedures. Entities 
seeking sponsorship will likely wish to work with these 
governments to develop a workable regime. Other entities, 
such as those interested in scientific research, other 
economic uses, and protection of the ocean and seabed 
resources, will want to assist with this process to ensure 
that their interests are respected and that developing 
States are given assistance to develop appropriate laws 
and enforcement capacity. Finally, the limitations and 
gaps in the Convention’s liability scheme have now been 
identified and await the international legal community’s 
attention.
Notes
1  The Chamber has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions when requested by 
the Assembly or Council of the International Seabed Authority. United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 191. All references to the 
Convention are taken from United Nations. (1983). The Law of the Sea: Official 
Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and 
Index, Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
Introductory Material on the Convention and Conference. U.N. Pub. Sales No. 
E.83.V.5.
2  UNCLOS, Article 136. For detailed treatment of the concept of common 
heritage see Baslar, K. (1998). The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind 
in International Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
3  Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. U.N.Doc. A/RES/48/263 
(28 July 1994).
4  UNCLOS, Annex III Article 8. Under UNCLOS Annex III Article 9, paragraph 
4 (to the extent it has not been modified by the 1994 Agreement on Part XI, Annex, 
Section 2) it is also possible for any party to notify the Authority of its intent to 
submit a plan of work in a reserved area.
5  ISBA/16/C/6 (5 March 2010), para. 1, at: http://www.isa.org.jm/files/
documents/EN/16Sess/Council/ISBA-16C-6.pdf.
6  ISBA/16/C/13 (6 May 2010), at: http://www.itlos.org/case-17/Dossier%20
No%207.pdf.
7  Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities 
with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, (Feb. 1, 2011)(hereafter 
“Advisory Opinion”), paras 31–71.
8  UNCLOS, Article 191: “The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall give advisory 
opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising 
within the scope of their activities. Such opinions shall be given as a matter of 
urgency” (emphasis added).
9  Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 65(1): “The Court may 
give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may 
be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make 
such a request” (emphasis added).
10  See, e.g., Written Statement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, para. 2.7, at: http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2010/
document_en_329.pdf; Written Statement of International Seabed Authority, 
para. 2.6, at: http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2010/document_en_342.pdf. 
See also Nordquist, M., Nandan, S., Rosenne, S. and Lodge, M.W. (Eds )United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. VI. Martinus 
Nijhoff.
11  Status of Eastern Carelia, [1923] P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (July 23). See also 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories, [2004] ICJ Rep (Advisory Opinion) (9 July 2004) at para. 44.
12  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
13  Accordance with International Law of the Declaration of Independence in 
respect of Kosovo, [2010] ICJ Rep (Advisory Opinion) (22 July 2010), at para. 
94.
14  Advisory Opinion, paras 94–96.
15  Freestone, D. (2011). “Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on ‘Responsibilities and Obligations 
of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect to Activities in the Area’”. 
ASIL Insights Vol. 15, Issue 7 (Mar. 9, 2011).
16  Advisory Opinion, para. 100.
17  Ibid., paras 103 to 104.
18  Note from the Secretary of State of the US in the Negrete Affair, In: Moore, VI 
Digest of International Law, 1906, at 962; Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), III 
UNRIAA 1905, 1938-1981 (1949); The United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, Stockholm, 1972; Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, G.A. Res. 62/68, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/68 (6 December 2007); 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) Merits, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2010.
19  Advisory Opinion, para. 110.
20  Ibid., para. 117.
21  Ibid., para. 119.
22  Ibid., para. 119.
23  Ibid., para. 132; Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia 
v. Japan) (2000) 1 (1) MJIL 153.
24  Advisory Opinion, para. 135.
25  Ibid., para. 161. See Payne, C. (2011). “Chamber advises caution in seabed 
mining”. IntLawGrrls March 8 2011, at: http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com.
26  UNEP Expert Group on best available techniques and best environmental 
practices. (2003). “Use of the terms best available techniques, best environmental 
practices and related concepts in international environmental instruments”. UNEP/
POPS/EGB.1/INF/3 (29 January 2003).
27  Advisory Opinion, para. 145.
28  Ibid., para. 148.
29  Ibid., para. 159.
30  Written Statement of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, para. 
111, at: http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2010/document_en_336.pdf. See also 
Oral Statement of Ambassador Joel Hernandez G., Legal Adviser of the Mexican 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, ITLOS/PV.10/2/Rev.1 (15 September 2010), 
pp. 46–47, at: http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2010/document_en_345.pdf.
31  Advisory Opinion, paras 209–211.
32  Ibid., para. 205.
33  Ibid., para. 180.
34  The Area has been described as “formally subject to an international (treaty-
based) public trust regime”. Sand, P.H. (2007). “Public Trusteeship for the Oceans”. 
In: Ndiaye, T.M. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and 
Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah, at 536. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers.
35  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain); 
Second Phase, [1970] ICJ Reports 3; Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia) [1995] ICJ Reports 90. See Treves, T. (2010). “Principles and Objectives 
of the Legal Regime Governing Areas beyond National Jurisdiction”. In: Molenaar, 
E.J. and Oude Elferink, A.G. (Eds), The International Legal Regime of Areas beyond 
National Jurisdiction: Current and Future Developments, at 16–17. Leiden Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff. See also Brunneé, J. (2007). “Common Areas, Common Heritage 
and Common Concerns”. In: Bodansky, D., Brunneé, J. and Hey, E. (Eds), Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law. Oxford: OUP.
36  Advisory Opinion, para. 241; UNCLOS, Article 209(2).
37  Pulp Mills, p.58, para. 197. The Court held that the obligation to prescribe 
“appropriate rules and measures ... is an obligation to act with due diligence in respect 
of all activities which take place under the jurisdiction and control of each party. It 
is an obligation which entails not only the adoption of rules and measures, but also a 
certain high level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative 
control applicable to public and private operators, such as monitoring of activities 
undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of other [parties].”
38  Advisory Opinion, para. 218.
